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Abstract
In this study, we predict a pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring over the course of
economic development. We assume that o¤shoring requires both workers and capital
in the o¤shored country. Hence, the accumulation of capital in the o¤shored country
has two opposing e¤ects on o¤shoring. On the one hand, it decreases the rental price of
capital rendering o¤shoring more attractive. On the other hand, it increases the wage
rate of workers rendering o¤shoring less attractive. Putting these two e¤ects together,
we analytically generate an o¤shoring Kuznets curve (i.e., an inverted-U pattern of
o¤shoring), consistent with what observed in China.
JEL classication: F11, F16
Keywords: trade, o¤shoring, economic development
Chu: angusccc@gmail.com. University of Liverpool Management School, University of Liverpool, Liv-
erpool, UK. Cozzi: guido.cozzi@unisg.ch. Department of Economics, University of St. Gallen, St. Gallen,
Switzerland. Furukawa: you.furukawa@gmail.com. School of Economics, Aichi University, Nagoya, Japan.
1
"A growing number of American companies are moving their manufacturing back to the
United States." The Economist (2013)
1 Introduction
From the mid 1990s to the late 2000s, the amount of o¤shoring from developed countries
to China steadily increased. Xing (2012) documents that the volume of processing trade
in China increased from about US$10 billion in 1994 to US$300 billion in 2008. However,
this increasing trend of o¤shoring in China started to reverse in the early 2010s.1 Figure
1 presents the time trend of manufacturing imports as a share of GDP in China. The
gure shows that even before the recent trade dispute between China and the US, some
manufacturing activities already started to shift away from China. In this study, we show
how a simple model of o¤shoring can explain this pattern of o¤shoring and reshoring.
Figure 1
This emerging pattern of reshoring is due to the rising production cost in China. The
Boston Consulting Group (2012b) nds that the "15 to 20 percent annual increases in Chinese
wages [...] were rapidly eroding Chinas manufacturing cost advantage over the U.S.". Porter
1According to the Boston Consulting Group (2011), "[t]ransportation goods such as vehicles and auto
parts, electrical equipment including household appliances, and furniture are among seven sectors that could
create 2 to 3 million jobs as a result of manufacturing returning to the U.S. - an emerging trend that
is expected to accelerate starting in the next ve years". In a subsequent survey, the Boston Consulting
Group (2012a) nds that "[m]ore than a third of U.S.-based manufacturing executives at companies with
sales greater than $1 billion are planning to bring back production to the United States from China or
are considering it". For example, in April 2012, GE announced a $1 billion investment in the business of
domestic appliances with the objective of reshoring manufacturing tasks from plants in China and Mexico
to plants in the US; see Financial Times (2012).
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and Rivkin (2012) also argue that rapidly rising wages abroad represent an important trend
that is beginning to make US rms favor locating their production domestically. Yang et al.
(2010) document the time series of real wages in China and nd that the average real wages
more than tripled from 1997 to 2007. Figure 2 presents the time trend of average wages in
China.
Figure 2
Another important stylized fact of economic development in China is that physical capital
has been accumulating at a rapid rate in China. According to Bai et al. (2006), gross xed
capital formation as a share of gross domestic product in China increased from 30% in 1978
to 42% in 2005. Figure 3 presents the time trend of the stock of capital in China.
Figure 3
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At the rst glance, capital accumulation in China should lead to a gradual reduction in
o¤shoring because of its positive e¤ect on wages, which renders o¤shoring less attractive.
However, if one considers an often neglected fact that o¤shoring also requires the use of
domestic capital in the o¤shored country (i.e., o¤shored production requires both workers
and equipment in the o¤shored country), then capital accumulation in China would also
have a positive e¤ect on o¤shoring.
To generate the abovementioned patterns, it su¢ces to consider the seminal model of o¤-
shoring in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).2 We extend the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg
model by allowing for the possibility that o¤shoring of labor-intensive tasks requires the use
of both workers and capital (e.g., plants, equipment, information and telecommunication
structures3) in the o¤shored country. In this case, an increase in the capital stock in China
has two opposing e¤ects on the incentives of o¤shoring. On the one hand, it increases the
wage rate of workers rendering o¤shoring less attractive. On the other hand, it decreases the
rental price of capital rendering o¤shoring more attractive. According to Bai et al. (2006),
the rate of return to non-mining capital in China decreases from 30% in the mid 1980s to
less than 20% in the early 2000s. Putting these two e¤ects together generates an inverted-U
e¤ect of capital accumulation on the equilibrium level of o¤shoring, which gives rise to an
inverted-U pattern of o¤shoring over the course of economic development.4 We refer to this
pattern as an o¤shoring Kuznets curve, which has been observed in China. However, our
prediction does not apply only to the albeit very important Chinese case, but also to the
generality of other o¤shored countries.
2 A simple model of o¤shoring and reshoring
We consider the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg model of o¤shoring. The model consists of two
goods j 2 fx; yg, which are produced using labor and capital in the form of two varieties
of tasks: L-tasks and K-tasks. The measure of each variety of tasks is normalized to one.
Firms in the developed country produce both goods. In addition to employing local workers,
they can also o¤shore some of the L-tasks to workers in the developing country. Here we
di¤er from Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) by assuming that this o¤shoring process
also requires the use of capital in the developing country in order to capture a simple fact
that workers in China require local equipment to complete the o¤shored tasks. Therefore,
both capital and labor in the developing country can either be used for domestic production
or for o¤shoring production.
We will refer to the developing country (for example, China) as the home country. To
illustrate our story, it su¢ces to consider a simple case of the Grossman-Rossi-Hansberg
2In the literature on o¤shoring, there is an important alternative strand of studies that focus on the choice
of organizational form by rms; see the seminal studies by McLaren (2000), Grossman and Helpman (2002,
2004, 2005), Antras (2003), Antras and Helpman (2004) and Antras et al. (2006).
3Communication between the o¤shored country and the o¤shoring country is essential for the o¤shoring
activity, which requires telephones, faxes, and computers, etc.
4Krenz, Prettner, and Strulik (2018) develop a complementary model able to generate a similar pattern
of o¤shoring and reshoring in a richer environment also featuring R&D and automation.
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model by assuming that the home country is a small open economy.5 In order for the e¤ects
of factor supplies to work explicitly, as is well known in international trade theory, we
also need more factors than produced goods;6 therefore, we assume that the home country
produces only one good, say good y. In this industry, a rm needs afy units of domestic
factor f 2 fL;Kg to perform a typical f -task. Due to substitutability between L-tasks
and K-tasks, rms choose aLy and aKy to minimize their cost. Following Grossman and
Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we assume that there is no substitution within the f -tasks, so that
each task must be performed once to produce a unit of good y.
If a foreign rm in industry j performs L-task i using local workers, it requires aLj
units of local labor. If the foreign rm performs L-task i through o¤shoring, it requires
lj(i) = a

Ljt(i) units of labor and kj(i) = lj(i) units of capital in the o¤shored country.
We assume that the o¤shored tasks require the use of capital for the o¤shoring process. The
parameter  > 0 is a shift parameter that inversely captures technological improvement in
o¤shoring, and the parameter   0 measures the extent to which each o¤shoring worker
requires local capital (e.g., the equipment that each worker needs to perform the tasks). t(i)
is a continuous function, and the tasks are ordered by increasing di¢culty of o¤shoring (i.e.,
t0(i) > 0 for i 2 [0; 1]).
Due to the assumption of the home country being a small open economy, all foreign vari-
ables denoted by superscript  are given exogenously. Naturally, we focus on the equilibrium
in which o¤shoring exists by imposing the following parameter restrictions:
w > t(0)(w + r), (P1)
w < t(1)(w + r). (P2)
Given (P1) and (P2), there must exist a threshold value denoted as I 2 (0; 1), such that
w = t(I)(w + r). (1)
The left-hand side of (1) is the wage cost for rms in the foreign country whereas the
right-hand side is the o¤shoring costs of task I. In both industries j 2 fx; yg, for i  I,
foreign L-tasks are o¤shored to the home country. For i > I; foreign L-tasks are performed
domestically in the foreign country.
In the home country, the unit cost for domestic rms in industry y is waLy+raKy. Perfect
competition implies
waLy + raKy = py = 1, (2)
where we normalize the world price of good y to py = 1. The factor-market condition for
labor in the home country is given by
aLyy + Z

Z I
0
t(i)di = L, (3a)
5In an online appendix (see Appendix B), we consider a two-country version of the model and show that
capital has an inverted-U e¤ect on o¤shoring if and only if the elasticity of substitution between x and y is
greater than unity.
6Given this assumption, factor price equalization does not hold. Although capital may be mobile across
countries in reality, there is capital control that leads to imperfect capital mobility in China, so the rental
prices of capital in China and abroad should not be equalized.
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where Z  aLxx
 + aLyy
 captures the production scale in the foreign economy. In other
words, labor in the home country is either used for domestic production aLyy or o¤shoring
production Z
R I
0
t(i)di for foreign rms. Similarly, the factor-market condition for capital
in the home country is given by
aKyy + Z

Z I
0
t(i)di = K. (3b)
In other words, capital in the home country is either used for domestic production aKyy or
o¤shoring production Z
R I
0
t(i)di for foreign rms.7
From cost minimization, we can derive afy(w=r) as a function of w=r, where w is the
wage rate of workers and r is the rental price of capital. Taking afy(w=r) into account,
the equilibrium conditions (1), (2) and (3) determine fw; r; y; Ig. Using (3), we can express
capital intensity in the home country as
aKy
aLy
=
K   Z
R I
0
t(i)di
L  Z
R I
0
t(i)di
. (4)
Given that aKy=aLy is naturally an increasing function of w=r,
8 the ratiow=r can be expressed
using (4) as
w
r
 !(I;K). (5)
By (4), we may note two properties of the function !: (a) ! is increasing (decreasing) in I if
K > (<) L; and (b) ! is increasing in K. We now solve (2) and (5) for r and w to obtain
the expressions of w (!(I;K))9 and r(!(I;K))10, where w0() > 0 and r0() < 0.11
We substitute w (!(I;K)) and r(!(I;K)) into (1) to obtain
w = t(I)[w (!(I;K)) + r (!(I;K))], (6)
which determines the equilibrium level of o¤shoring I for a given K. The o¤shoring costs
in the right-hand side of (6) may increase or decrease with !(I;K), and the following chart
summarizes the intuition.
K " ) !(I;K) " )
r # ) o¤shoring cost #
w " ) o¤shoring cost "
) I "# .
As K increases, the capital cost r decreases but the wage cost w increases. To understand
how these e¤ects a¤ect o¤shoring, we consider a CES technology with the following unit
production function
h
 (aKy)
" 1
" + (1  ) (aLy)
" 1
"
i "
" 1
= 1, where " > 0 is the elasticity of
7To ensure a positive output of y, we assume L > Z
R I
0
t(i)di and K > Z
R I
0
t(i)di.
8We will consider an explicit production function below.
9Specically, w (!(I;K)) = !(I;K)=[!(I;K)aLy(!(I;K)) + aKy(!(I;K))].
10Specically, r(!(I;K)) = 1=[!(I;K)aLy(!(I;K)) + aKy(!(I;K))].
11In Appendix A, we derive these comparative statics.
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substitution between capital and labor. Cost minimization implies that the factor price ratio
in (5) becomes
!(I;K) =
1  


aKy
aLy
 1
"
=
1  

 
K    Z
R I
0
t(i)di
L  Z
R I
0
t(i)di
! 1
"
. (7)
Finally, using (7) and the unit production function, we can express (6) as12
w = t(I)
8>><
>>:

"! (I;K)" 1 + (1  )"
 1
" 1| {z }
w(!(I;K))
+ 
h
" + (1  )"! (I;K) (" 1)
i 1
" 1| {z }
r(!(I;K))
9>>=
>>; . (8)
We rst consider the special case of  = 0 as in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008).
In this case, a larger stock of capital increases the wage rate of workers rendering o¤shoring
less attractive; in other words, capital has a monotonically negative e¤ect on o¤shoring I,
which is inconsistent with empirical observation. When  > 0, the negative e¤ect of capital
on the rental price r generates an additional positive e¤ect on o¤shoring. Putting these
two e¤ects together generates an inverted-U relationship between o¤shoring and capital,
which is consistent with the recently observed inverted-U pattern of o¤shoring in China. We
summarize all these e¤ects in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 As capital K increases in the o¤shored country, the wage rate w increases
and the rental price r of capital decreases. As for the equilibrium level of o¤shoring I, it
rst increases and then decreases after K exceeds L. In other words, there is an inverted-U
relationship between o¤shoring I and the capital stock K in the o¤shored country.
Proof. Di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (8) with respect to I, we can show that it is
monotonically increasing in I, noting (7).13 Given that the left-hand side of (8) is constant
and that a single crossing of the two sides of (8) is guaranteed by (P1), (P2) and the continuity
of t(i), there uniquely exists an equilibrium level of I that is determined by the intersect of
both sides. Di¤erentiating the right-hand side of (8) with respect to K, we can show that it
is decreasing (increasing) in K when K < (>)L, noting (7).14 Finally, a simple graphical
analysis would su¢ce to complete the proof.
3 Conclusion
In this study, we rst summarized a phenomenon of o¤shoring and reshoring in China.
Then, we developed a simple framework to explain this changing pattern on the location of
12In Appendix A, we provide the derivations.
13In Appendix A, we provide the derivations.
14In Appendix A, we provide the derivations.
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manufacturing tasks. In summary, we nd that economic development in o¤shored coun-
tries initially causes an increase in o¤shoring activities but eventually leads to a return of
o¤shoring tasks to developed countries. Intuitively, capital accumulation as a result of eco-
nomic development in o¤shored countries raises the wage rate of workers and reduces the
rental price of capital giving rise to a U-shaped pattern in the cost of o¤shoring over the
course of economic development, which in turn leads to an inverted-U pattern of o¤shoring.
We refer to this pattern as an o¤shoring Kuznets curve.
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Appendix A
Comparative statics of r() and w():
Assume that the unit production function F (aKy; aLy) satises the standard neoclassical
properties: for each i = K; L; @F (aKy; aLy) =@aiy = Fi (aKy; aLy) > 0; @
2F (aKy; aLy) =@ (aiy)
2 =
Fii (aKy; aLy) < 0; F (aKy; aLy) = F (aKy; aLy) for any  > 0: First, given the homogene-
ity of degree 1 in function F (aKy; aLy), we can have
r = F1 (aKy; aLy) and w = F2 (aKy; aLy) , (A1)
noting py = 1: We can easily verify from Eulers homogeneous function theorem that
Fi (aKy; aLy) is homogeneous of degree 0 for each i; implying F1 (aKy; aLy) = F1 (aKy=aLy; 1)
and F2 (aKy; aLy) = F2 (aKy=aLy; 1) : Given these two expressions, with Fii (aKy; aLy) < 0;
F1 (aKy; aLy) is a decreasing function in aKy=aLy: Since @
2F (aKy; aLy) = (@ (aKy) @ (aLy)) =
F21 (aKy; aLy) > 0 holds due to the neoclassical properties, F2 (aKy; aLy) = F2 (aKy=aLy; 1) is
an increasing function in aKy=aLy: By the cost minimizing condition F2 (aKy; aLy) =F1 (aKy; aLy) =
w=r; we then verify a positive relationship between aKy=aLy andw=r:As a result, F1 (aKy; aLy)
(F2 (aKy; aLy)) is a decreasing (increasing) function in w=r. Equation (A1) ensures that r
(w) increases (decreases) with w=r:
Derivations of equation (8):
The cost minimization condition gives rise to
aKy
aLy
=


1  
w
r
"
. (A2)
By (A1) and (A2),
r =

" + (1  )"
w
r

 (" 1)
 1
" 1
and w =

"
w
r
" 1
+ (1  )"
 1
" 1
are calculated from the CES production function. Together with (6), these expressions would
prove (8).
Comparative statics of equation (8):
w = t(I)
0BB@ "! (I;K)" 1 + (1  )" 1" 1 +  " + (1  )"! (I;K) (" 1) 1" 1| {z }

(I;K)
1CCA .
First, with (7), di¤erentiating 
(I;K) with respect to I yields
@
(I;K)
@I
= "

" + (1  )"! (I;K) (" 1)
 2 "
" 1
	(I;K)
d!(I;K)
dI
;
where
	(I;K)  1  
 
L  Z
R I
0
t(i)di
K   Z
R I
0
t(i)di
!
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and
d!(I;K)
dI
= (!(I;K))1 "

1  

"
Zt(I)
"
K   L
L  Z
R I
0
t(i)di
2 :
Note that both 	(I;K) and d!(I;K)=dI are strictly positive if and only if K > L. Thus,
@
(I;K)=@I > 0 always holds. Given t0(I) > 0, the right-hand side of (8) increases with I:
Next, di¤erentiating 
 with respect to K yields
@
 (I;K)
@K
= "
 
"! (I;K)" 1 + (1  )"
 2 "
" 1 ! (I;K)" 2 	(I;K)
d!(I;K)
dK
;
where, in the same way as above, 	(I;K) > 0 if and only ifK > L:Given that d!(I;K)=dK >
0 always holds, we have shown that the right-hand side of (8) increases with K if K > L
and decreases with K if K < L.
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Appendix B (for online publication only)
In this appendix, we explore the robustness of our result when the foreign variables are
endogenously determined in a two-country setting. Once again, we assume that there are
more factors than produced goods in order for the e¤ects of factor supplies to work explicitly.
Therefore, we can naturally consider the case of complete specialization. Suppose that the
home country produces good y, whereas the foreign country produces good x. In this setting,
we nd that there is an additional relative-price e¤ect that works against the capital-supply
e¤ect that we have identied above. On the one hand, the relative-price e¤ect gives rise
to a positive e¤ect of capital on o¤shoring. On the other hand, the capital-supply e¤ect
gives rise to either a negative e¤ect (when  = 0) or an inverted-U e¤ect (when  > 0) of
capital on o¤shoring. Suppose  is equal to zero; in this case, capital has a monotonically
negative (positive) e¤ect on o¤shoring if and only if the elasticity of substitution between x
and y is greater (less) than unity. Therefore, the model is unable to generate an inverted-U
relationship between capital and o¤shoring under  = 0. However, under  > 0, capital has
an inverted-U e¤ect on o¤shoring if and only if the elasticity of substitution between x and
y is greater than unity. For simplicity, we focus on the case of the Cobb-Douglas production
function for the production of goods x and y.
We follow Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008) by assuming that foreign rms use su-
perior technologies. The technology di¤erence implies that factor prices are higher in the
foreign country than in the home country in equilibrium. Since all task trade is costly, only
the rms in the country with superior technologies engage in o¤shoring. Let A < 1 denote
the technological superiority of foreign rms. This implies that if a foreign rm does all tasks
at the same level as a home rm, the output of the foreign rm is greater 1=A times.
The unit cost for foreign rms in industry j can be written as
AwaLj(1  I) + A
 (w + r) aLj
Z I
0
 t(i) di+ AraKj: (B1)
By using (1), the unit cost (B1) can be written as A
 
waLj
(I) + r
aKj

; where 
(I) =
1   I +
R I
0
t(i) di =t(I). Perfect competition in the foreign country for industry x requires
that
A (waLx
(I) + r
aKx) = px: (B2)
Perfect competition in the home country for industry y is characterized by (2).
The labor market clearing condition in the home country in (3a) and (3b) can be rewritten
as
aLy y + a

Lxx

Z I
0
t(i)di = L and aKy y +  a

Lxx

Z I
0
t(i)di = K; (B3)
noting Z = aLxx
: As for the foreign country, we can have
aLxx
 =
L
1  I
and aKxx
 = K: (B4)
From (B3) and (B4), we express the capital intensities as
aKy
aLy
=
(1  I)K    L
R I
0
t(i)di
(1  I)L  L
R I
0
t(i)di
and
aKy
aLy
=
(1  I)K
L
: (B5)
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The good market equilibrium condition requires that the relative supply and demand are
cleared in equilibrium:
x
y
= D(px); (B6)
where D(px) denotes the world relative demand for good x with the usual property D
0(px) <
0:We assume a CES utility function, so that the relative demand function becomes D(px) =

1 
1
px

; where  is the share parameter for x and  is the elasticity of substitution between
x and y:
For simplicity, we consider the Cobb-Douglas technology in both countries: (aKx)
 (aLx)
1  =
1 for the home country and (aKx)
 (aLx)
1  = 1 for the foreign country, where  is a factor
share of capital in the foreign country. Cost minimization gives rise to the factor price ratios
as
w
r
=
1  


aKy
aLy

=
1  

(1  I)K    L
R I
0
t(i)di
(1  I)L  L
R I
0
t(i)di
 !(I;K) (B7)
and
w
(I)
r
=
1   
 
 
aKy
aLy
!
=
1   
 
(1  I)K
L
 !(I); (B8)
in which we apply (B5). Cost minimization also results in the unit factor demands as
aLy =

!(I;K)
1  

 
and aKy =

!(I;K)
1  
1 
(B9)
for the home country and
aLx =

 !(I)
1   

  
and aKx =

 !(I)
1   
1  
(B10)
for the foreign country.
Now we can characterize the equilibrium prices (px; w; r; w
; r), by using the above con-
ditions. By substituting (B3) and (B4) into (B6),
L
(1  I)L  L
R I
0
t(i)di
aLy
aLx
= D(px) =


1  
1
px

:
By substituting (B7), (B8), (B9) and (B10) into this, the relative price of good x is obtained
as
px =

1  

(1 I)1  
(K) (L)1  

K    L
R I
0
t(i)di
1 I
 
L  L
R I
0
t(i)di
1 I
1  1
 p(I;K); (B11)
where dp(I;K)=dI < 0 and dp(I;K)=dK > 0: By (2), (B7) and (B9), we obtain the factor
prices in the home country as
w = ~ !(I;K)  w(I;K) and r = ~ !(I;K) (1 )  r(I;K): (B12)
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where ~   (1  )1  : By (B2), (B8), and (B10), we obtain the foreign wage as
w =
1   
A

K
L
 Relative price e¤ectz }| {
p(I;K) 
Labor supply e¤ectz }| {
(1  I) 

(I)|{z}
Productivity e¤ect
 w(I):15 (B13)
As in Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2008), we can decompose the wage e¤ects of o¤shoring
in the o¤shoring country into the productivity e¤ect, the relative price e¤ect, and the labor
supply e¤ect.
By (B12) and (B13), the o¤shoring condition (1) can be expressed as
1  
A
(I)

(1 I)K
L
 
p(I;K)| {z }
w(I)
= t(I)
0B@~!(I;K)| {z }
w(I;K)
+  ~ !(I;K) (1 )| {z }
r(I;K)
1CA ; (B14)
which is identical to (8) except that the foreign wage is endogenous as a function in I and
K: Using (B14), we can show that Proposition 1 is robust in the two-country setting. Dene
  1  1

for simplicity. Then we have:
Proposition 2 Suppose that  > 1 and  > 0: As capital K increases in the o¤shored
country, the equilibrium level of o¤shoring I rst increases and then decreases. There is an
inverted U-shaped relationship between K and I:
Proof. Note that when  > 1;  2 (0; 1): By using (B7) and (B11), (B14) can be rewritten
as
 (1   ) (K) 
(1  )A (L) +(1 )
(1  I) +(1 )
t(I)
(I)
= (1  )
 
K   L
R I
0
t(i)di
1  I
! 
L  L
R I
0
t(i)di
1  I
!
 (1 (1 ))
+
 
K    L
R I
0
t(i)di
1  I
!
 (1 ) 
L  L
R I
0
t(i)di
1  I
!(1 )
: (B15)
We can easily show that the left-hand side (LHS) of (B15) decreases with I (noting that
t(I)
(I) increases with I due to the denition of 
(I)). We can also show that the right-
hand side (RHS) of (B15) increases with I by di¤erentiating it with respect to I with  < 1:
With (P1) and (P2), (B15) uniquely determines the equilibrium level of I; as an intersection
of both sides, denoted as I(K):
15Note: r =  
A
px

L
(1 I)K
1  
:
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By di¤erentiating the RHS of (B15) with respect to K given I; we can show that the
RHS decreases (increases) with K if
K < (>) 
1  
(1  )
 
L 
1  
1  
L
R I(K)
0
t(i)di
1  I(K)
!
 (K): (B16)
In completing the proof, we rst consider the lower bound of K; i.e., L
R I
0
t(i)di=(1 I),16
around whichK < (K) holds.17 Given that the RHS (LHS) of (B15) is upward (downward)
sloping in I, this implies that dI(K)=K > 0 for lower K:
Then, when K increases from the lower bound, I(K) increases and thus, by (B16), (K)
decreases. Thus, as K increases, K < (K) will eventually become K = (K): Dene K^ by
K^ = (K^); then, dI(K^)=dK = 0 holds. When K marginally increases from K^; the marginal
increase of the LHS in (B16) is 1; whereas that of the RHS is 0 (since dI(K^)=dK = 0 and
d(K^)=dK = 0): Therefore, there exists ' > 0 such that for K 2 (K^; K^ + '); K > (K)
and thus dI(K)=dK < 0.
Finally, when K further increases, I(K) decreases (since dI(K)=dK < 0), and so (K)
increases. Thus, as K continues to increase from K^, K < (K) may hold again. However,
we can show that this is not the case. Suppose there exists ~K > K^ such that ~K = ( ~K).
This requires dI( ~K)=dK = 0 and thus d( ~K)=dK = 0; so that a further increase in K from
~K leads to K > (K) for the same reason as above. Therefore, K  (K) holds for any
K > K^: Given that K > (K) holds for a su¢ciently large K (since (K) is bounded
from above), it implies K > (K) holds for any K > K^: Then, we have dI(K)=dK < 0 for
K > K^; proving an inverted-U relationship between K and I:
16The lower bound comes from the assumption that K > L
R I
0
t(i)di=(1  I):
17Note that 0 <  < 1 and the assumption L   L
R I
0
t(i)di=(1   I) > 0: Also note that  > 0 since
(1  )=(1  ) 2 (0; 1) by  2 (0; 1):
16
